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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a Motion to Modify Divorce Decree 
brought by the defendant (R.84) wherein defendant sought to have 
the original Decree of Divorce (entered herein on October 5, 
1972) (R.24-27) modified by having child support money reduced. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson in two days of trial, the first on January 23, 1979, 
and the final day of trial approximately eleven months later 
on December 4, 1979. 
At the conclusion of the trial, after having takenthe 
case under-advisement, the trial court ordered that the Decree 
of Divorce originally entered in this action, together with 
paragraphs C, D and E or a prior Order Modifying the Decree 
(which was entered on November 30, 1977, R.60-65) be modified. 
By the terms of the Decree of Divorce and the aforesaid modif i-
cation, defendant was, prior to the instant proceeding ordered 
to pay the plaintiff a fixed amount of child support money of 
$1,000 per month ($166.66 per month for each of six children of 
the parties), together with an additional amount of child sup-
port in the event his income exceeded a certain minimum. The 
Court modified the aforesaid provisions by requiring defendant 
to pay to plaintiff $1,110 per month ($185 per child), to be 
reduced to $1,000 per month when the first of the parties 1 
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children ceased to be entitled to child support (hence $200 
per child per month at that time) , and the Court deleted 
entirely the aforesaid provision providing for supplemental 
child support in the event defendant's income exceeded said 
minimum. 
In addition, the Court defined the term "fulltime 
student" as being a child in school and carrying the number of 
hours that the particular institution defines as a fulltime 
student, and the Court ordered that the modification date was 
to be effective on the day it was signed, to-wit, April 18, 
1980. (R.130-131) 
Plaintiff has appealed from the Order of April 18, 
1980. (R.132) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the aforesaid Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce entered April 18, 1980, reversed, and to have 
child support payments governed as provided in the original 
Decree of Divorce entered October 5, 1972, as modified by the 
aforesaid Order and Order Modifying Decree entered November 30, 
1977. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original Decree of Divorce (R.24-27) was entered 
pursuant to stipulation (R.10-13) (except as to grounds). It 
provided, among other things, that a fixed monthly child 
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support for each of the six children of the parties was to be 
paid by defendant to plaintiff, and in addition, provided for 
a supplemental amount of child support which would be variable 
and which would be determined in accordance with the following 
formula. We quote from paragraph 9 of the Decree: 
"9. It is ordered that in the event defendant's 
net income from his dental practice exceeds $24,000 
per year (before income taxes, but after professional 
dues and equipment and other like expenses of his pro-
fession), plaintiff is awarded as child support, in 
addition to the $12,000 per year hereinabove pro-
vided for, one-half of the excess of said net income 
over $24,000 after deduction from said net income of 
an amount equal to the income tax attributable to 
such increase. Thus, for example, if in a given 
year, the defendant's net income before income 
taxes, but after professional dues and equipment 
and other like expenses of his profession, is 
$26,000, the excess over $24,000 in this instance 
is $2,000, from which an amount would be deducted 
which is equal to the income tax attributable to 
said $2,000 (being the income tax on $26,000 less 
what the income tax would have been on $24,000), 
and the plaintiff shall receive one-half of the 
remaining balance after said income tax on said 
excess is deducted from said $2,000. Defendant is 
ordered to furnish to plaintiff access at all reason-
able times and places to his records. It is ordered 
that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply 
until the expiration of sixteen months after the 
date of the aforesaid Stipulation and Consent, that 
date being October 12, 1972." 
On April 22, 1977, plaintiff initiated an Order to 
Show Cause proceeding against the defendant to have the supple-
mental child support money which had accrued under the aforesaid 
paragraph 9 of the Decree of Divorce reduced to judgment inas-
much as the same had not yet been paid by the defendant. On 
June 8, 1977, the defendant filed a Motion to Modify Decree of 
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Divorce (R.39) supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties (R.36-37) and an Affidavit (R.38). Both the Motion to 
Modify Decree of Divorce (which is referred to hereinafter as 
the first modification proceeding) and the aforesaid Order to 
Show Cause were heard by Honorable David K. Winder on the 19th 
day of September, 1977, and after a hearing on those issues, 
Judge Winder entered his Order on November 30, 1977 (R.60-64). 
At that time the Court reduced to judgment the arrears of child 
support money which had accrued under the aforesaid paragraph9 
in the amount of $4,455.50 ($103.50 for 1974; $1,486.40for1975; 
and $2,963.50 for 1976). The Court at that time ruled on the 
constitutional issue raised by the defendant (which is not 
involved in the present appeal proceeding) and finally in 
paragraphs C, D and E of that Order (R.62,63,64) modified the 
aforesaid paragraph 9 by providing that the supplemental child 
support money was to be computed by reference to the defendan~s 
federal income tax returns as opposed to general records, pro-
vided for the mechanics of defendant's furnishing information 
to the plaintiff in order to compute the supplemental amount of 
child support money, and provided that the paragraph 9 formula, 
although it would remain the same for computing the supplemental 
child support, would be reduced by one-sixth as each of the 
children of the parties ceased to be entitled to child support 
money. We set forth paragraphs C, D and E in full for the con-
venience of the Court: 
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"C. The first sentence of paragraph 9 of the 
said Decree of Divorce is modified to read as follows: 
"'IT IS ORDERED that in the event defendant's net 
income from his dental practice exceeds $24,000.00 per 
year as declared on his federal income tax return 
(before income taxes, but after professional dues and 
equipment and other like expenses of his profession) , 
plaintiff is awarded as child support, in addition to 
the $12,000.00 per year hereinabove provided for, one-
half of the excess of said net income over $24,000.00 
after deduction from said net income of an amount 
equal to the income tax attributable to such increase.' 
"The remainder of paragraph 9 shall remain in full 
force and effect as presently set forth in the Decree 
of Divorce. It is thus the intention of the Court 
that in determining additional child support, if any, 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the said Decree of Divorce, 
the parties shall refer to the items set forth in the 
federal tax return, and not to extraneous items which 
have not been incorporated in the return. Nevertheless 
defendant is not precluded from making bona fide amend-
ments to his tax returns, and in the event of such a 
bona fide amendment, the defendant shall be entitled 
to an appropriate adjustment. The Court notes that 
currently the relevant schedule to be used in deter-
mining defendant's liability, if any, under paragraph 
9 of the Decree of Divorce as amended is the Federal 
Schedule C. 
"D. IT IS ORDERED that hereafter the defendant 
furnish to the plaintiff copies of state and federal 
returns within two weeks after they are filed. Plain-
tiff will then have two weeks after receipt thereof 
in which to submit to the defendant the amount of 
additional child support which plaintiff contends is 
owing under the Decree of Divorce as modified. Defend-
ant shall have two weeks from receipt of notice of 
said claimed amount in which to serve notice of 
objection thereto. If no such notice of objection 
is served within that two-week period, the sum sub-
mitted by plaintiff to defendant shall stand as the 
amount owing to the plaintiff by the defendant as and 
for additional child support. However, if the claimed 
sum is denied, then either party shall have the right 
to apply to the court for a hearing to determine the 
proper amount of additional child support money, if any. 
,, 
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"E. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that increased child 
support money as provided in paragraph 9 of the Decree 
of Divorce as amended shall be deemed payable one-
sixth (1/6) for each of the children of the parties. 
Thus, although the method for computing the total 
additional child support under paragraph 9 of the 
Decree of Divorce as amended shall remain constant, 
the amount actually paiq by defendant to the plain-
tiff will be subject to appropriate reduction as the 
children cease to be entitled to child support in 
accordance with the other provisions of the Decree 
of Divorce." 
On February 17, 1978, less than three months after 
entry of the first Order Modifying Decree of Divorce (referred 
to above) , the defendant filed another Motion for Modification 
of Decree (R.84) supported by an Affidavit (R.81-83). That 
Affidavit was supplemented by a second Affidavit filed Decern-
ber 5, 1978 (R. 94-99) . 
We will deal with the allegations of this Motion in 
detail under Point I hereafter. However, for present purposes 
it will suffice to point out that the thrust of defendant's 
argument was that, although his gross income had increased 
from approximately $55,326 in 1972 to $92,359 in 1977, his per-
centage of profit had decreased, although his net income had 
increased from $26,808 in 1972 to $31,324 in 1977. 
Plaintiff's answer to defendant's position was set 
forth in an instrument entitled Motion in Opposition to Defend-
ant's Motion for Modification and was supported by an Affidavit 
(R.88-91). The thrust of plaintiff's defense was: 
1. That the petition was barred by the principles 
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res judicata; 
2. That the petition failed to state a claim against 
the plaintiff upon which relief could be granted, i.e., failed 
to allege grounds justifying a modification; 
3. That there was no sufficient change of circum-
stances in any event. 
The second Petition for Modification was heard by the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, on January 23, 1979, and 
testimony was concluded on December 4, 1979. In its modification 
the Court deleted the provisions for supplemental child support 
money and substituted in its place an order that the defendant 
pay to plaintiff $185 per month child support money for each 
child, to be increased to $200 per month per child when one of 
the children is no longer entitled to support payments. As 
noted above, the Court also defined the term "fulltime student" 
and decreed the changes to be effective April 18, 1980 (R.130-
131) . 
The transcript of testimony from the trial on January 
23, 1979, is hereinafter referred to as "T" and the testimony 
from the hearing on December 4, 1979, is hereinafter referred 
to as "2T". 
The defendant testified that he knew of the problem 
which was the basis for his second Motion for Modification at 
least as early as 1976 (T.26,T.58). 
At the commencement of trial on the second day, 
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December 4, 1979, the Court ruled in effect that events trans-
piring prior to the date of the trial of the first Petition for 
Modification (September 19, 1977) were res judicata and would 
not be admissible in this proceeding. However, the Court ruled 
that inasmuch as the defendant's finances for 1977 were not 
fully known to him at that time, the Court would allow testi-
mony with regard to his financial situation throughout the 
entire year of 1977 (2T.3;2T.30;2T.52). Thereafter the trial 
was basically restricted to a consideration of the change of 
circumstances between 1977 and 1979. In this connection, it 
should be noted that the Court admitted into evidence defend-
ant's financial records for the first six months of 1979 over 
plaintiff's objections (2T.57). Objection was made because 
these records were not part of defendant's pleadings and had 
not been furnished to plaintiff's counsel prior to the trial. 
The Court erred in admitting the same. Also there 
was no showing that defendant 1 s financial records ror thefi~st 
half of 1977 were not available to defendant as of Septemberl9, 
1977. 
We desire now to summarize the testimony with regard 
to the alleged change of circumstances between 1977 and 1979 as 
follows: 
The defendant's financial records (which set forth the 
facts in this connection) are found in Exhibit P-2, which is 
defendant's tax records for 1977, Exhibit 8-P, which consists 
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which consists of defendant's income tax records for 1978, and 
Exhibit D-4, which consists of a summary of defendant's testi-
mony regarding his income for the first six months of 1979. 
In addition, after the Court's ruling that matters prior to 
1977 were inadmissible, Exhibit D-1 remained viable only with 
regard to the information set forth for 1977, and in addition, 
an exhibit prepared by the plaintiff, Exhibit 11-P, was ad.mi tted 
in evidence with regard to the year 1977 only and shows the 
defendant's 1977 income, including his percentage of profit as 
claimed by the defendant and also how those figures would appear 
if a salary of $8,000 paid by the defendant to his second wife 
in 1977 were considered as defendant's own income, and we will 
discuss that matter further hereafter. 
Defendant's Income. 
The following is a summary of defendant's earnings for 
1977, .1978 and 1979: 
Gross 
Income 
Over-
head 
Net 
Income 
1977 
$92,359 
61,035 
31,324 
1978 
$82,395 
55,961 
26,434 
1979 (first 
six months) 
24,890.20 
17,214.09 
1979 (projected 
for twelve months) 
$84.208.58 
49,780.40 
34,428.18 
In addition to his dental practice, the defendant 
testified that he taught a corrununity education course, frornwhich 
he had a small income (2T.29). The defendant also testified that 
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he invested $25 per month in an investment club (2T.90). 
The defendant remarried in 1976 (T. 9,10) and has two 
children by this second marriage (2T.28). Defendant's second 
wife had earnings of $12,473 in 1977 (Exhibit P-2) and defend-
ant testified that $8,000 of that sum was paid by defendant to 
his wife as a salary for services allegedly rendered by her £or 
(2T.84) 
him~ Defendant's second wife had income in 1978 of $9,890 
(Exhibit 8-P) and defendant testified that $8,400 of this sum 
was paid to her by the defendant for alleged services (2T.84). 
Defendant did not testify to the amount he paid his 
wife in 1979, but stated that it would be less than $10,000 
(2T.45). The salary paid to defendant's second wife by defend-
ant was listed in 1977 in the figure for his general office~~e=-
head, but was listed as a separate item in 1978 {2T.81). 
Defendant testified that he works as a dentist in a 
clinic in Granger and that the clinic provides generally for his 
needs, does the billing for him, and collects his accounts (2T. 
77-78). He stated that his wife did not work at the clinic, but 
wrote some checks for him at home, called on some bad accounts, 
and kept records for him at home, although the exact nature of 
that record-keeping was not d~sclosed (T.48). 
At 2T.47 the defendant stated that: "I pay my wife a 
salary so that I can make an end run on the clause that is in 
the decree." At 2T.84 defendant testified with regard to the 
services performed by his wife, and we set forth the following 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
from the transcript: 
"Q What services did she render? 
A As far as I am concerned it is relative. I have 
already stated to the Court I pay her so that I 
can live. 
Q Do you consider that, the money you paid your 
wife, was really income to yourself? 
A That is possible. 
Q You don't pretend she did any specific things? 
A She does do some things. I don't know it is 
worth $8,000." 
In referring to the employment of his wife, defendant's 
own counsel in closing argument at 2T.129 referred to defendant 
as not being "straight arrow" and e.gain on page 2T. 13 0, ref erred 
to the arrangement as a "sham." 
Plaintiff's Income. 
Plaintiff testified that she remarried on May 12, 1979 
(2T.S)·, and with regard to the children of the parties, she·testi-
fied that five were still at home and one was attending college 
at Utah State University (2T.142). She stated that her only 
income was approximately $200, which she received from sale of 
an asset she had owned in 1977 (2T.26-27). She testified that 
she had borrowed $34,000 in 1975 and that that sum was owing in 
1977 (2T.15), and that the said $200 per month was paid or was 
available to be applied on the aforesaid indebtedness of $34,000 
( 2T. 2 6) • 
The plaintiff testified that in 1977 she was receiving 
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church welfare which consisted of food and utility bills, and 
that the sum of approximately $1,800 was paid by the Church for 
her other expenses between April 1977 and November 1977 (2T.17; 
2T.19). She stated that she was unemployed in 1977 and also at 
the time of the trial, but that she had worked briefly from Feb-
ruary of 1978 to October 1978 (2T.6). She also testified that 
her present husband was now paying her expenses and contributed 
to the home approximately the amount which his presence added 
to household expenses (2T.8). 
Insurance. 
Defendant was ordered toRmaintain for the benefit of 
the children of the parties the life insurance which he had at 
the time of the divorce and also health and accident insurance 
(see paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, R.26). The defend-
ant testified that this life insurance was not a term policy, 
but rather a policy whereby he was building up an equity for 
his retirement. He further testified that the cost of the life 
insurance had not changed at all since the time of the Decree 
2T.106), but that his health and accident insurance increased 
from $450.84 in 1977 to $840 in 1979 (2T.33}, but it still did 
not cost him anymore to have his children by his f i~st marriage 
included in the policy along with his present wife and the two 
children by his second marriage (2T.76}. Thus, even if defend-
ant were not required to provide that benefit to the children 
of his first marriage, there would be no savings to him thereby. 
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The defendant testified that he was providing a dis-
ability insurance for the benefit of the children of his first 
marriage, although he testified that the disability insurance 
runs only to him (T.55). The Decree of Divorce does not 
require defendant to provide or maintain disability insurance. 
Self-Employment Tax. 
Defendant's self-employment tax in 1977 was $1,304, 
in 1978 was $1,434, and he testified that in 1979 his self-
employment tax would be $1,700 (2T.52). 
The defendant was asked to give his reasons for seeking 
a modification of the Decree· of Divorce. In addition to the afore-
said matters relating to change of circumstances, defendant tes-
tified substantially that his reasons for seeking modification 
of the Decree of Divorce were: 
1. That it was inequitable and unworkable and that 
it required him to have an accountant and plaintiff to have an 
accountant with a potential for disagreement (2T.38). 
2. Defendant stated that under the original Decree 
of Divorce: "Under this thing I am unable to show that I can't 
pay that." (T.40) 
Defendant's own expert witness, a certified public 
accountant by the name of James W. Anderson, testified as follows 
when he was asked whether the fonnula under the Decree of Divorce 
as modified was workable. He stated at T.70: "It's workable, 
but it takes time to make the calculations, but it is a wor~able 
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calculation." 
Defendant also testified at T.59 when asked whether 
in each year from 1972 to 1976 a dollar figure had been arrived 
at under the formula as follows: "Well, it had been arrived at, 
because her accountant did it, yes." 
Fulltirne Student Issue. 
The plaintiff testified that since August 1979 defend-
ant had reduced her child support money by the sum of $166 per 
month, claiming that one of the children was not a fulltirne stu-
dent (2T20-21) . With regard to that issue the Court ruled that 
the propriety of defendant's deducting $166 per month from the 
plaintiff's child support would not be ruled on in this proceed-
(2T.23) 
ing as it was· not before the Court/. By reason of the Court's 
ruling, no-evidence was introduced on that issue. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court in its final 
Order defined "full time student" and ruled in paragraph 2 (R.131) 
as follows: 
"It is· further ordered that a child shall be con-
sidered a fulltime student when such child is in shoal 
and carrying the number of hours that the institution 
defines as a fulltime student. The foregoing pro-
vision is intended to apply to a normal school year 
of approximately nine months. If a child complies 
with the foregoing provisions, the child support 
money shall be paid for such child during the normal 
summer vacation of three months, even though such 
child is not in school during the said summer 
vacation." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE 
GROUNDS JUSTIFYING MODIFICATION AND AS BEING BARRED 
BY THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA. 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Divorce Decree (R.84), 
which is the subject of the present proceeding, sought to achieve 
a modification of the original Decree of Divorce by showing an 
alleged change of circumstances between the time of the entry of 
the original Decree on October 25, 1972, and the time of the 
filing of the said Motion, to-wit, February 17, 1978, notwith-
standing that a prior Motion for Modification brought by the 
defendant had just been disposed of by Order of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County entered November 30, 1977 (R.60-64). 
The plaintiff claims that the second Motion for Modification was 
barred by the principles of res judicata as to events prior to 
the first modification proceeding. Res judicata would of neces-
sity preclude the second Motion for Modification from stating a 
claim with regard to events prior to November 30, 1977. The 
sufficiency of the allegations of said Motion would thus have 
to be tested with regard to the period beginning November 30, 
1977, and ending on the date the second Motion was filed, which 
was February 17, 1978, or at most to December 5, 1978, when a 
Supplemental Affidavit was filed by the defendant. (R. 94-95). 
The defenses of res judicata and failure to state a 
claim were raised by the plaintiff in her answer to defendant's 
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second Motion for Modification [which answer was actually 
entitled Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Modifi-
cation (R.88), which was supported by an Affidavit (R.90-91) .] 
In asserting the aforesaid defenses, plaintiff sought 
to dismiss defendant's Motion for Modification at the outset. 
These Motions were incorporated in a Memorandum which was served 
upon defendant's counsel on the first day of trial, January 23, 
(R.111-114) 
1979, at which time it was filed with the court~ (The Memorand~~ 
was apparently not placed in the file by the Court until October 
26, 1979.) At the conclusion of these arguments, the Court took 
that matter under advisement and gave the defendant ten days to 
reply. (It was anticipated by the Court and the parties that 
the case could not be finished as to the evidence in one day and 
would have to be concluded on a separate day in the event fur-
ther evidence was required. The case was set for further hear:~; 
on April 13, 1979, and notice thereof was served February 5, 1979, 
but the actual concluding day of trial was not held until Decem-
ber 4, 1979.) In any event defendant never did file a response 
to said Memorandum within ten days, or otherwise. (See Minute 
entry R.100 regarding these events.) 
It is plaintiff's contention that the said Motion to 
Dismiss should have been granted, both on the merits and for 
failure of the defendant to respond on January 23, 1979, or at 
least ten days (approximately) thereafter. 
As to the matter of res judicata, it should be noted 
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that the Decree of Divorce in this action was entered on the 
25th day of October, 1972 (R.24-28). It was entered pursuant 
to stipulation signed by the parties and their counsel (R.10-
13) . As noted in the Statement of Facts the Decree contains a 
provision with respect to child support fixing an amount cer-
tain and also providing for a supplemental amount in the event 
that the defendant's income should increase above a specified 
minimum as set forth in the Statement of Facts. Those pro-
visions of the Decree are set forth in the Statement of Facts 
at page 3 of this brief, so we will not repeat them at this 
point. 
A careful reading of those provisions shows that the 
clause providing for a supplemental amount of child support was 
before the Court in 1977 and was, in fact, modified in at least 
three respects: Federal tax records were to be used as opposed 
to gen.eral records; mechanics of ascertaining the additional 
amount were spelled out; and provision for handling that clause 
as the children ceased one by one to be entitled to child sup-
port were set forth. 
It thus appears clear that the first modification 
hearing fully considered the matter of the supplemental child 
support clause and amended it extensively. Although defendant 
did not at that time raise the matters contained in his second 
Motion for Modification, those items could, and should, have 
been raised (except perhaps for the three-month period between 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
November 30, 1977, and February 17, 1978, when the second Motion 
for Modification was filed) . 
By reason of the failure of the Court to grant plain-
tiff's Motion to Dismiss, substantially all of the testimony of 
the first day ·of trial on January 21, 1979, was irrelevant as it 
was devoted to testimony relating to the exhibit which was 
attached to defendant's Supplemental Affidavit (R.94-99), which 
exhibit was introduced in evidence as Exhibit D-2 over plain-
tiff's objection. That exhibit dealt with events transpiring 
between the years of 1972 and 1977. Only 1977 was relevant. 
At the conunencement of the second day of trial on 
December 4, 1979, the Court in effect granted plaintiff's Motion 
on the matter of res judicata by ruling that evidence prior to 
the hearing in the first modification proceedings (September 17, 
1977, was irrelevant and would be precluded, except the Court 
allowed testimony of the defendant's income for the entire year 
of 1977 on the theory that as of the hearing on September 19, 
1977, all of the information relating to the defendant's 1977 
income was not known. 
Thus, although the Trial Court upheld plaintiff's con-
tention of res judicata as of January 1, 1977, we believe that 
the Court should have upheld the defense of res judicata as of 
the time of the Court's Order of November 30, 1977, or at least 
as of September 19, 1977, for all purposes. First of all, since 
defendant was permitted to introduce testimony of the first one-
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half of 1979, he should have been held to the same standard 
in 1977, as there was no showing that his financial records 
for at least the first one-half of 1977 were not available to 
him. Second, it is the date of the Order of Modification that 
appears to be controlling. 
At 18 ALR 2d, page 18, the following statement is 
set forth: 
"Where there have been one or more previous 
decisions on motions for modification of a decree, 
the question whether there has been a substantial 
change in the circumstances of the parties is 
determined with respect to the period commencing 
with the date of the most recent order on a motion 
for modification and not with respect to the time 
since the original decree was entered." (Emphasis 
added) 
In Hudson v. Hudson, 8 Wash 2d 114, 111 P2d 573 (1941), 
the appellant in 1938 petitioned for an award of alimony (the 
\ 
court having reserved jurisdiction on that matter) . At that 
hearing the court held that there was not sufficient change of 
circumstances and denied the application. The appellant again 
brought a similar motion in 1940, which was denied, and the 
appellant appealed from that 1940 order. The court held that 
the issue was whether or not there was a change of circumstances 
since the 1938 order, not since the entry of the original decree. 
At page 574 the court said: 
"The order made preceding the one which is now 
before us not having been appealed from is res judi-
cata, unless there has been, since that order was 
entered, a material change in the circumstances 
of the parties." (Emphasis added) 
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In 24 Am Jur2d§676, Divorce and Separation, the 
following statement is found at page 795: 
"Where the court has entertained and decided one 
petition for modification, the order entered in that 
proceeding is res judicata, so that one cannot maintain 
a second petition for modification unless he can show 
that since the entry of· the order on the first petition 
for modification there has been a substantial change 
of circumstances." (Emphasis added) 
In Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Ut 216, 198 P2d 233 (1948), 
this court considered the same question. In that case the 
defendant claimed that he entered into a stipulation prior to 
the decree of divorce regarding alimony based upon the represen-
tation of his attorney that he could later get it reduced. The 
court held that the defendant was in effect seeking to have the 
original decree modified because it was claimed to be unfair and 
not because of any change of circumstances. The court held that 
the defendant was precluded from obtaining a change in the decree 
since .there was no change of circumstances which would warrant 
that relief. The court stated at page 224: 
"What defendant is really contending is that the 
alimony awarded by the interlocutory divorce decree 
was excessive. His proper remedy would have been to 
appeal from that decree. A petition for modification 
is not the proper way to have changed the terms of an 
erroneous alimony decree. 
In point of fact, defendant is in a poor position 
to complain. He stipulated to an alimony decree of 
$250 per month, apparently without any expection of 
ever complying with it. He is hardly in a favorable 
position now to assert that the alimony awarded is 
excessive." 
It seems clear that the instant case is almost 
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identical with Osmus. The defendant's principal contention 
is that the original divorce provision is not fair to him and 
not really that there has been any change of circumstances. 
We do not believe that the facts support either contention. 
Defendant has not appealed the Court's ruling on the 
question of res judicata, and we take it therefor that at the 
very least, events prior to January 1, 1977, are precluded from 
consideration. Events prior to November 30, 1977, are likewise 
barred, we believe, and urge this court to so hold. 
Further, we therefore take it that in canvassing the 
pleadings of the defendant to determine whether they state grounds 
for modification, they will be tested by the period from Novern-
ber 30, 1977, (or September 19, 1977, to December 5, 1978, or at 
most from January 1, 1977, to December 4, 1979). We do not 
believe that in either time period the defendant's pleadings 
state .grounds for modification. 
Prior to actual examination of defendant's pleadings, 
we desire to observe the following: It has long been the lawin 
this state that a modification of a decree of divorce cannot be 
granted unless there is a material and permanent chanqe of cir-
cumstances since the preceding order. In Carson v. Carson, 87Ut 
1, 47 P2d 894 (1935), the court stated at page 4: 
"In a proper case the amount of alimony awarded 
in a decree of divorce may be changed. R.S.Utah 1933, 
40-3-5. The party to a divorce proceeding, however, 
is not entitled to a modification of the decree of 
divorce in the absence of a showing that there has 
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been a material and permanent change of conditions 
since the entry of the decree." (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
petition seeking modification must allege grounds for change. 
In Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Ut 570, 47 P2d 419 (1935), at page 
420 this court stated: 
"It is well settled in this court that in order 
to secure a change in a decree for alimony the moving 
party must allege and prove changed conditions arising 
since the entry of the decree which require, under 
rules of equity and justice, a change in the decree." 
(Emphasis added) 
And again in Jones v. Jones, 104 Ut 274, 139 P2d 222, 
(1943), the defendant husband sought modification of a decree 
with respect to alimony, and the court held at page 278: 
"In the instant case there is no pleading which 
would justify the finding made by the court 'that the 
sum of $50 a month is necessary for the proper main-
tenance and support of the plaintiff, Fuxia E. Jones.'" 
(Emphasis added) 
In the light of the foregoing principles, we desire to 
briefly review the allegations of defendant's pleadings in con-
nection with the Motion to Modify Divorce Decree. The said 
Motion itself (R.84) states as follows: 
"Comes now the defendant by and through his 
attorney and moves the Court for an Order modifying 
the Decree of Divorce entered herein on October 25, 
1972. This motion is based upon the Affidavit 
attached hereto." 
There is not even an allegation there with regard to 
material or permanent change of circumstances. 
We turn next to the Affidavit filed in support of the 
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aforesaid Motion found in the record at pages 81 to 83. In 
that Affidavit at page 3 the defendant alleges a "substantial 
change of circumstances," and in seven subparagraphs numbered 
"a" to "g" the defendant sets forth the alleged changes. We 
will quote the relevant parts of each subparagraph: 
"a. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
the parties reasonably contemplated an increase in 
income resulting from the defendant's practice of den-
tistry. The parties did not, however, contemplate that 
the defendant's income would increase 100% over a 
period of six years. Defendant's income in fact has 
increased approximately 100%. It was the contemplation 
of the parties that in the event the defendant's income 
did increase substantially, unpredictably and unfor-
seeably that an adjustment in the method of computation 
would be appropriate." 
Conunent: The foregoing paragraph deals with a six-
year period beginning at the time of the Decree of Divorce and· 
is thus barred by the principles of res judicata. Even aside 
\ 
from that, it is difficult to imagine how an increase of income 
over 100% can result in grounds for reduction of child support. 
Burthermore, it is clear that the parties contemplated that the 
defendant's income would increase; otherwise there would have 
been no point in stipulating to an additional amount as child 
support in the event defendant's income increased. 
"b. The costs of operation of the defendant's 
dentistry practice has increased substantially since 
the Decree of Divorce was entered, while the profit 
that he realizes has not increased in a like fashion. 
That the increase in the defendant's.income was sub-
stantial and unf orseeable and has in fact not pro-
vided defendant with the same margin of profit 
heretofore realized." 
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Cormnent: Paragraph b deals with the same period of 
time, 1972 to 1977, and is thus barred by res judicata. Further-
more, it is not the defendant's profit margin that is relevant, 
but rather his income. Paragraph b alleges an increase in 
income, and that appears to preclude further inquiry into that 
subject. In the case of Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P2d 
620 (1972) the trial court made a finding: 
"That since the divorce Mr. F's costs of doing 
business has substantially increased, as has his income, 
but not commensurate therewith." 
The Supreme Court rejected that finding as a basis for 
a modification of the decree and stated: 
"Nothing is reflected in this finding that would 
indicate that Mr. F's income had decreased so that he 
was reasonably unable to pay what he agreed or to 
justify the wiping our of a $12,000 per year alimony 
award, and we are unimpressed with such generalized, 
unspecific finding in this case." (p. 108) 
"c. That it reasonably was contemplated by the 
parties that the plaintiff would on the expiration 
of a reasonable time seek gainful employment to 
assist and participate in the monetary aspects of 
rearing the parties minor children. The plaintiff 
has never attempted to seek gainful employment and 
has in fact relied on child support as her sole and 
singular source of income, said income for her own 
support and the support of the parties children. 
That the plaintiff's failure to seek and secure 
gainful employment is a substantial change in 
circumstances as those circumstances were fairly 
and reasonably contemplated by the parties at the 
time the Decree of Divorce was entered." 
Conunent: The foregoing allegations are likewise 
barred by res judicata. It shoud further be noted that plain-
tiff was unemployed at the time of the divorce and unemployed 
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at the time of the first modification hearing and at the time 
of the second modification hearing, which would appear to be a 
circumstance which would not help the defendant in any event. 
During the trial the Trial Court properly ruled that 
what was contemplated by the parties prior to the Decree of 
Divorce was irrelevant and that the.case was governed by the 
written agreement (Stipulation), and for the same reasons, alle-
gations as to what was contemplated are irrelevant (T.22) 
"d. At the time the Decree was entered it was 
fairly contemplated that either or both plaintiff 
and defendant might re-marry. Subsequent to the 
divorce plaintiff did re-marry and then subse-
quently divorce her second husband, realizing 
from the second divorce a very substantial award 
of the second marital estate, the quantom of which 
award was not contemplated fairly by either plain-
tiff or defendant at the time of the 1972 Decree 
and plaintiff's interest as prescribed by the Court 
attendant her second divorce represents a very 
substantial change in her circumstances. 
.... 
"That the defendant has re-married and is 
presently 42 years of age. That the defendant's 
re-marriage was contemplated, however, the 
defendant's wife is pregnant and will give birth 
to a child on or about·June 12, 1978. The birth 
of the child was not contemplated by either plain-
tiff or defendant the time the Decree was entered 
in view of the fact that the plaintiff and defend-
ant had six children of their marriage and 
additionallv in view of the parties aaes. The 
- - -defendant's expected child constitutes a sub-
stantial change in circumstances." 
Comment: To begin with, the fact of defendant's 
remarriage is irrelevant. Felt v. Felt, supra, held at page 108: 
11 The fact of remarriage cannot be used in 
determining modification of an alimony award, although 
in some conceivable rare care it might, and we are at 
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a loss to know why the trial court so found, unless 
it was on account of what was said in Callister v. 
& Callister, supra, which recited the fact of remar-
riage, which we disaffirm if it is urged that such 
fact is admissible for the purposes of reducing 
the alimony award in the instant case." 
Furthermore, the aforesaid paragraph d is barred by 
res judicata and there is no allegation of any change of cir-
cumstances since the prior hearing of November 30, 1977, or 
for that matter September 19, 1977. The fact of plaintiff's 
remarriage is likewise irrelevant on the question of child sup-
port inasmuch as the second husband has no obligation for the 
support of the defendant's children. The allegations that no 
other children of a subsequent marriage was contemplated is not 
only irrelevant, but unbelievable. 
"e. That the 1972 Decree provided for generous 
and reasonable rights of visitation, which visitation 
was contemplated by both parties to include overnight 
and uninterrupted summer visitation. That the plain-
tiff has constantly, consistently and intentionally 
since the parties divorce denied the defendant reason-
able rights of visitation and plaintiff's conduct 
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances." 
Comment: The said paragraph is barred by res judicata. 
Furthermore, visitation problems, even if they exist, have no 
relevancy as to reasonable child support, particularly where 
there is no issue of custody or change-thereof. 
"f. That the 1972 Decree provided that defendant 
provide health and accident insurance for the benefit 
of the minor children, it was not contemplated by the 
parties that health and accident insurance would 
increase to a substantial sum said health insurance 
now represents and that that increase in insurance is 
significant and a substantial change in circumstances." 
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Comment: This allegation is barred by res judicata. 
What was "contemplated" is barred by the written Stipulation and 
Decree entered pursuant thereto. 
"g. That subsequent to the Decree the defendant 
purchased policies of disability insurance to provide 
for the support of his children in the event he was 
disabled and thus unable to earn a living. That this 
additional expense to defendant is substantial, for 
the benefit of the minor children and constitutes a 
significant change of circumstances." 
Comment: This allegation is not only barred by res 
judicata, but the Decree of Divorce nowhere requires defendant 
to provide disability insurance, and if he does so, it is volun-
tary on his part and constitutes no basis for a modification of 
the Decree. 
On December 5, 1978, defendant filed a Supplemental 
Affidavit in support of his Motion for Modification, and we will 
review the allegations thereof briefly. The substance of those 
allegations is contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 thereof, 
which we set forth verbatum: 
"l. That since February 1978, the date of 
defendant's last Affidavit, there has transpired and 
taken place additional changes which in fact are sig-
nificant and substantial, which further reflect a 
substantial change of circumstances as required 
and contemplated by 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated. 
"2. That subsequent to the determination of 
the defendant's 1977 tax situation, defendant has 
learned that his gross profit has been signifi-
cantly reduced from that which existed at the time 
of the divorce and all years subsequent. 
"3. That during the year 1977 the proportion 
of the defendant's net income which he realizes has 
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decreased substantially since the date of divorce 
and all years thereafter, which was not contem-
plated by the parties." 
Comment: It appears that defendant is saying that 
since he filed his petition he has found out that his net income 
between 1972 and 1977 has decreased. That is irrelevant in view 
of the principle of res judicata. Furthermore, it is not car-
rect because the defendant alleges in the petition filed Febru-
ary 17, 1978, that his net income decreased betwen 1972 and 
1977. (See paragraph b set forth on page 23 of this brief.)-
Furthermore, as noted above, the defendant's gross 
profit is irrelevant; it is any material and permanent increase 
or decrease in his income which is relevant. There is no alle-
gation that the defendant's income has decreased and that he is 
thereby no longer able to pay the support money as originally 
ordered by the Court. 
Attached to the Affidavit is a four-page exhibit which 
was introduced into evidence over plaintiff's objection at the 
trial as Exhibit 1-D. Even.considering that exhibit as a plead-
ing, it does not state a cause of action for amendment of the 
Decree because it constitutes a comparison of income betweenl972 
and 1977 and the intervening years, and all of the years prior to 
1977 are precluded from such consideration. If one is to con-
sider the material allged as to 1977 as being relevant, since 
there is no other year with which to compare that data in the 
pleadings, it is meaningless and cannot be the basis for 
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alleging a change of circumstances. 
Thus, all of the aforesaid allegations as they 
relate to the period 1972 to November 1, 1977, (or at least 
January 1, 1977, are barred from consideration, and since the 
pleadings therefor only allege matters relating to 1977, there 
are no allegations in this case which could possibly constitute 
a valid grounds for modification, and the Motion for Modifica-
tion should have been dismissed at the outset. 
POINT II.· THERE HAS BEEN NO SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMST.Al.'1CES 
BETWEEN THE FIRST MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND THE SEC-
OND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION TO JUSTIFY GRANTING THE 
SECOND MOTION. 
A sununary of the evidence in this regard reveals that 
the defendant's net income went from $31,324 in 1977 up to the 
sum of $34,428 in 1979, (if we project his income for the 
first half of the year for the entire year, and there appears 
to be no other reasonable wav of comoarina incomes in those two 
- - J 
years.) It is true that defendant's net income went down to 
$26,434 in 1978, but that was obviously only a temporary reduc-
tion in income and was by no means a permanent reduction. In 
addition, if we disregard the "sham" of defendant's paying his 
own wife a salary for substantially no services rendered, the 
defendant's net income in 1977 is increased to $39,324, and in 
1978 it is increased to $34,834, and in 1979, would be increased 
by a sum less than $10, 000, but presumably at least equal to the 
1978 figure of $8,400, which would increase defendant's net 
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income in 1979 to at least $42,828. 
In addition, at the time of trial, the defendant was 
receiving an additional income from a teaching position, although 
the amount thereof was not disclosed. 
On the other hand, plaintiff had no income except the 
sum of approxirnat2ly $200 which she was receiving monthly from 
the sale of an asset which she owned in 1977, which sum was used 
(or at least available) to liquidate a $34,000 debt incurred by 
her in 1975 and existing in 1977. Plaintiff's seconc husband 
was supporting her and contributing to the household only enough 
to cover his own expenses. Plaintiff's second husband was not 
supporting the children of plaintiff and defendant, and indeed 
had no obligation to do so. 
The only other relevant items were (1) the life insur-
ance, the annual cost of which had not changed at all since 1972; 
(2) the health and accident insurance which, although it had 
increased from $450.84 in 1977 to $840 in 1979, did ~ot ~esult 
in any additional cost to the defendant by reason of the child-
ren of his first marriage inasmuch as defendant would have to 
pay the same premium exactly for coveraqe for himself, his 
second wife and his two children by his second marriage; (3) the 
disability insurance which defendant claimed he was carryingwas 
a voluntary act and he was not, and is not now, required to carr.~: 
that insurance, and it cannot therefore be the basis of a change 
of circumstances; and (4) the final item is the defendant's 
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self-employment insurance, which has increased according to the 
defendant's testimony to the sum of $1, 700 in 1979 from a figure 
of $1,304 in 1977, an increase of $396. We respectfully submit 
that this is not a change of circumstances significant enough 
to warrant a modification of the Decree. It should further be 
noted that everyone who is self-employed has had a similar 
increase in their self-employment tax, and we believe that it 
is not a valid ground for modification of the Decree anymore 
than a general increase in the cost of living constitutes 
grounds therefor. 
It appears that the real reason defendant seeks a 
modification of the provision for.additional child support 
money is that he believes it is inequitable. We respectfully 
submit that it is not inequitable, and that the additional 
amount of child support calculated for 1977 as set forth in 
defendant's own exhibit D-1 (page 3 thereof) showing a supple-
mental child support of $1,980 is not unreasonable considering 
-
his gross income of $92,359. Although the defendant only shows 
a net income that year of $31,324, if we add his wife's "sham" 
income thereto, he had a net income of $39,324. 
For the years 1972 through 1976, the total supplemental 
child support amounted to the sum of $4,455.50 [as reduced to 
judgment by Judge Winder (R.61)]. We do not believe that those 
figures constitute an unconscionable result. The Decree of 
Divorce was stipulated to by the defendant with the advice of 
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counsel. It was entered into by the parties to enable the 
children of the parties to participate in any increased earnings 
of the defendant, and, although the children would not be living 
in the defendant's home, the children would thereby be enabled 
to enjoy some of the fruits of defendant's dental practice, 
and would therefore in a very real sense be raised as the 
children of a successful dentist, a status which the ~arties 
felt the children were entitled to en]oy. 
Now defendant appears to be dissatisfied wit~ that 
arrangement; but we respectfully submit that that is not grou~~ 
for modification. As was pointed out in Osmus v. Osmus, supra, 
the defendant is not permitted to renege on a stipulation just 
because he later feels dissatisfied therewith. As ~oted above, 
the court there stated: 
"A petition for modification is not a proper -.:vvay 
to have changed the terms of an erroneous alimonv 
decree " 
and in like fashion, it is not a proper way to cha~se t~e te=ms 
of the Decree~of Divorce with respect to child support. 
POINT III. THE ORDER OF MODIFICATION CAi~NOT BE SUPPORTED 
WITHOUT FINDINGS OF FACT, OR AT LEAST A SUFFICIE~T 
INDICATION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE BASIS FOR ITS 
DECISION. 
The decision of the Court in this case is f ou~d in a~ 
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce found at R.130-131. Prior 
thereto, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision on December 14, 
1979 (R.117). Neither of these documents contains any - . ~ . ril'"lc.ings 
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of fact, nor do they reveal any basis for the Court's decision. 
The case of Felt v. Felt, 27 Ut 2d 103, 493 P2d 620 
(1972), held at page 108: 
"We think the written findings in this case are 
so fragmentary and unspecific as not to justify the 
drastic elimination of any annual $12,000 award 
except for a dollar and we so hold." 
It appears to us that this court has thus held in 
effect that sufficient findings of fact are necessary to support 
a modification of a decree of divorce. If this were not so, it 
would be irrelevant whether the findings were "fragmentary and 
unspecific" inasmuch as no findings would be required--fragmen-
tary or otherwise. 
It is true that Rule 52 (U.R.C.P.) provides that 
findings are not necessary on motions, and that defendant has 
denominated his pleading a motion. We believe, hoWever, that 
rule 52 was not intended to apply to cases which involve a pro-
longed and lengthy trial of contested issues, whether it is 
technically denominated a "motion," "petition," or "complaint." 
We believe that as it is used in that rule, a "motion" contem-
plates a proceeding which will be basically heard on matters of 
law, or if facts are involved, will be largely handled by affi-
davit or minor evidentiary proceedings. 
The instant case has all of the earmarks of a full-
fledged trial: It lasted two days and involved approximately 
225 pages of testimony. 
We believe, under the circumstances, the present 
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proceeding was a trial, not a motion, and that findings of fact 
were indeed necessary, or at the very least, some reasonable 
indication by the Court of the basis for his decision. 
POINT IV. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO UNDERTAKE TO DEFINE 
THE TERM "FULLTIME STUDENT" IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
The Court ruled that on the question of whether or 
not the defendant was justified in withholding $166 per month 
child support for the oldest child of the parties (on the 
alleged basis that she was not a fulltirne student) was not 
before the Court. By so ruling, the Court precluded testimony 
on that issue. 
We believe it was error for the Court t~ modify the 
Decree by defining the term "fulltime student" without per-
mitting the parties an opportunity to address that question--
both factually and in argument. The issue of whether any of 
the children of the parties are fulltirne students under the 
Decree should be resolved in the light of the facts and circum-
stances of this case, which can only be developed at a proper 
proceeding therefor. To define that phrase in the abstract 
without testimony or argument is unfair to the parties. It is 
in the nature of an "ex post facto law" when it is decreed 
without reference to the facts of the case. Even it it were 
fair to the parties in the future to be governed by that defi-
nition (as the parties can govern themselves accordingly), it 
is not fair to have that definition stated in the abstract and 
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then applied without an opportunity to be heard. 
If the parties are unable to resolve their differences 
in that regard, an order to show cause hearing can be held to 
determine the facts and circumstances, and the judge at that 
hearing should apply the original Decree to the facts as they 
are there developed. At present we have a situation where a 
judge defined a nterm" without hearing the facts, and that 
definition will presumably be binding upon a judge who, at a 
later time, is in a far better position to apply the Decree 
to those facts, and that judge should not be bound in advance 
of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully 
requests the court to reverse the Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce entered by Judge Wilkinson on April 18, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
ROMNEY, MADSEN & CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
320 South Third East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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